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BEGGARS CAN'T BE VOTERS: WHY WASHINGTON'S
FELON RE-ENFRANCHISEMENT LAW VIOLATES THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Jill E. Simmons
Abstract: The Washington State Constitution denies persons convicted of felonies the
right to vote until their civil rights have been restored. Civil rights are restored when offenders
complete all aspects of their sentence, including paying the legal-financial obligations
imposed at sentencing. Payment of legal-financial obligations presents a significant hurdle to
offenders trying to reclaim their right to vote. According to the Washington Department of
Corrections, roughly 46,500 offenders in Washington have not had their right to vote restored
solely because of unpaid legal-financial obligations. The right to vote is a fundamental right
secured by the United States Constitution, yet the United States Supreme Court has affirmed
that states have the right, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to disenfranchise persons
convicted of crimes. While the constitutional requirements of felon disenfranchisement are
settled, the requirements of felon re-enfranchisement are an open question. This Comment
argues that felon re-enfranchisement laws must not discriminate in ways that violate the
traditional voting rights requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. As one requirement, the
U.S. Supreme Court has held that states cannot require the payment of money as a
qualification for voting. Therefore, Washington's requirement that offenders pay their legal-
financial obligations before re-enfranchisement violates the Equal Protection Clause because
it conditions the fundamental right to vote on the payment of money to the state.
John' was released last year from a Washington State prison after
serving time for a felony theft conviction. Although he has a job earning
$7.50 an hour, John has not been able to pay the $1,200 in monetary
sanctions-officially called "legal-financial obligations" 2-that were
assessed during sentencing. Suppose that under Washington State law,
John does not have the right to free speech because he has not finished
1. Hypothetical created by the author for illustrative purposes.
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(27) (2002) defines a legal-financial obligation as:
[A] sum of money that is ordered by a superior court of the state of Washington... which may
include restitution to the victim, statutorily imposed crime victims' compensation fees as
assessed pursuant to RCW 7.68.035, court costs, county or local drug funds, court-appointed
attorneys' fees, and costs of defense, fines, and any other financial obligation that is assessed to
the offender as a result of a felony conviction. Upon conviction for vehicular assault while
under the inuence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, RCW 46.61.522(1)(b), or vehicular
homicide while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, RCW 46.61.520(1)(a),
legal-financial obligations may also include payment to a public agency of the expense of an
emergency response to the incident resulting in the conviction, subject to RCW 38.52.430.
Although the statute does not hyphenate the phrase "legal-financial obligations," the
two words are hyphenated throughout this Comment for clarity and to emphasize the
connection between the legal and financial aspects of the obligation.
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paying his legal-financial obligations. Under this law, Washington
requires offenders to complete all aspects of their sentence, including
payment of legal-financial obligations, before restoring their free speech
rights.a Angered by a recent ballot initiative, John wants to express his
views by passing out flyers on a street comer, but he is prevented from
doing so until he pays his legal-financial obligations. Across town, Sarah
is on the sidewalk handing out flyers on the same ballot initiative. She
also was released from jail last year, but her family could afford to pay
her $1,500 of legal-financial obligations. As a consequence, her free
speech rights were fully restored upon payment.
The scenario described above seems preposterous. Surely no court
would uphold a state law that restricted offenders' free speech rights
following release from prison until they paid their legal-financial
obligations.' Yet, while no state restricts First Amendment rights in this
way, the scenario reflects the law in many states regarding another
fundamental right: voting. Some states, including Washington, deny
offenders the right to vote until they have paid their legal-financial
obligations.5 As a result, while John can pass out flyers expressing his
feelings on the upcoming initiative, he cannot vote on it. Sarah, on the
other hand, can vote. The only difference between Sarah and John is their
ability to pay.
In the United States, an estimated 3.9 million U.S. citizens are
disenfranchised because of criminal convictions, including over one
million who have fully completed their sentences.6 Forty-eight states
3. The author has invented this state law for illustrative purposes. No law in Washington State
requires that offenders pay their legal financial obligations before regaining free speech rights.
4. No state has enacted a law that restricts offenders' free speech rights following release from
prison. However, in Turner v. Safely, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that restrictions on prisoners'
fundamental rights are permissible only if necessary to advance legitimate penological interests. 482
U.S. 78, 89 (1987). It is difficult to imagine a scenario where restrictions on released offenders' free
speech rights would be necessary to serve legitimate penological interests.
5. Washington is among more than a dozen states that deny felons voting rights until they have
satisfied all conditions of their sentence, including payment of legal-financial obligations. See
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, RESTORING YOUR RIGHT TO
VOTE, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/restorevote/restorevote.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2003)
(summarizing what offenders must do to restore their voting rights in each state.); Jamie Fellner &
Marc Mauer, Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States 4
(Human Rights Watch and The Sentencing Project, October 1998). For example, Alaska (ALASKA
STAT. § 15.05.030 (Michie 2002)), Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-46, 9-46a (2001)),
Minnesota (MINN. STAT. §§ 201.014, 609.165 (2002)), and Texas (TEx. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 11.002
(Vernon 2002)) deny felons the right to vote until they have completed all aspects of their sentence.
6. Fellner & Mauer, supra note 5, at 4.
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restrict offenders' voting rights to some extent.7 State restrictions range
from disenfranchisement only during incarceration to permanent denial
of the right to vote. In Washington, persons convicted of felonies are
disenfranchised until they have received a "discharge," which they will
receive after they have served any prison sentence, completed
community placement,9 and paid all legal-financial obligations imposed
during sentencing.'" Felons may bypass this process only if the governor
grants them a pardon." As of 1998, more than 150,000 Washington
residents did not have the right to vote because of felony convictions. 2 In
addition, the Washington Department of Corrections (DOC) estimates
that as of December 2001, 46,500 offenders remained disenfranchised
solely because of pending legal-financial obligations. 3
The United States Constitution does not expressly guarantee the right
to vote, but the U.S. Supreme Court has nonetheless held that once states
grant citizens the right to vote, voting becomes a fundamental right
protected by the Constitution. 14 According to the Court, the right to vote
is a "fundamental matter in a free and democratic society," 5 and as such
any infringement on that right must be "meticulously scrutinized."' 6 In
the last fifty years, the Court has struck down a number of state laws that
restricted citizens' voting rights, including laws requiring payment of
money to the state. 17 However, the Court has upheld state laws that
7. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, available
at http://www.sentencingproject.org/brief/publ046.pdf (last updated Nov. 2002) (summarizing state
felon voting rights laws); see also UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS
DIVISION, RESTORING YOUR RIGHT TO VOTE, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/restorevote/restorevote.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2003) (summarizing what
offenders must do to restore their voting rights in each state).
8. Fellner & Mauer, supra note 5, at 3-4.
9. Under Washington's Sentencing Reform Act, offenders are sentenced to periods of community
placement rather than parole and probation. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.700 (2002). While under
community placement, the offender lives in the community but remains under the supervision of the
Department of Corrections. Id.
10. WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (denying the right to vote for all persons convicted of "infamous
crimes" unless they have had their civil rights restored); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.96.050 (2002)
(providing for the restoration of civil rights upon discharge).
11. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.96.010.
12. Fellner & Mauer; supra note 5, at 6.
13. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AGENCY FISCAL NOTE FOR SENATE BILL 6519 (2002).
14. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
15. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
16. Id.
17. Harper, 383 U.S. at 668.
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disenfranchise persons convicted of crimes. In Richardson v. Ramirez,"8
the Court held that, in spite of the heightened protection of voting rights,
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment allows states to distinguish
between persons convicted of crimes and all other citizens when granting
the right to vote. 9 Since Ramirez, the Court has continued to uphold a
state's ability to deny felons the right to vote upon conviction, but has
struck down state disenfranchisement laws that are otherwise
discriminatory.20
This Comment does not challenge Washington's right under Section 2
of the Fourteenth Amendment to disenfranchise persons convicted of
crimes. Rather, it argues that Section 2, as interpreted in Ramirez, allows
states to distinguish between offenders and other citizens for voting
rights purposes but not among offenders in ways that violate traditional
voting rights principles. This Comment contends that when reinstating
offenders' voting rights states must comply with the voting rights
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause and, therefore, may not
impose qualifications that discriminate against certain offenders.
Specifically, Washington may not require felons to pay money to the
state as a prerequisite for re-granting voting rights.2 Currently,
Washington conditions the grant of offenders' voting rights on the
payment of legal-financial obligations. Thus, Washington gives voting
rights to some offenders but not others--even offenders convicted of the
same crime-based on their economic circumstances.22 By requiring
payment of money to the state without advancing a compelling state
interest, Washington's re-enfranchisement system violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not determined the constitutional
requirements of felon re-enfranchisement. Consequently, this Comment
draws on analogous precedent in cases protecting voting rights, cases
identifying the scope of offenders' rights, and cases addressing other
fundamental rights to demonstrate why Washington's re-enfranchisement
requirement violates the Equal Protection Clause. Part I of this Comment
describes Washington's felon disenfranchisement and re-
enfranchisement laws and the effects of conditioning offenders' voting
18. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
19. Id. at 54.
20. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
21. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666.
22. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.96.050 (2002).
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rights on the payment of legal-financial obligations. Part II provides an
overview of the U.S. Supreme Court's voting rights doctrine. Part III
acknowledges that states may disenfranchise persons convicted of
crimes, but notes that the Court has not addressed re-enfranchisement of
offenders. Part IV specifically highlights the Court's treatment of laws
that condition voting on the payment of money and examines the extent
to which other fundamental rights may be restricted based on a failure to
pay legal-financial obligations. Finally, Part V argues that Washington's
re-enfranchisement of offenders, only after paying legal-financial
obligations, violates the Equal Protection Clause because it conditions
the fundamental right to vote on the payment of money to the state
without advancing a compelling state interest.
I. WASHINGTON CONDITIONS RESTORATION OF FELONS'
VOTING RIGHTS ON THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL-
FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS
The Washington State Constitution denies to all persons convicted of
felonies the right to vote unless they have had their civil rights restored.23
Convicted felons' civil rights are restored if they complete all the
requirements of their sentence, including jail time, community
placement, and payment of all legal-financial obligations.24 The civil
rights restoration process reinstates all rights "lost by operation of law
upon conviction."" The rights "lost by operation of law" include only
political rights26 and the right to bear arms.27 Moreover, the right to vote
is the only fundamental right lost upon conviction.28 Many offenders
have a difficult time satisfying their legal-financial obligations, resulting
sometimes in permanent denial of the right to vote.29
23. WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3 ("All persons convicted of infamous crime unless restored to their
civil rights... are excluded from the elective franchise.").
24. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.96.050 (2002); id. § 9.94A.637 (2002).
25. Id. § 9.94A.637(3).
26. The right to vote, WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3; WASH. REv. CODE § 29.10.097 (2002), and the
right to serve on a jury, id. § 2.36.070, are the only political rights expressly lost upon conviction.
However, a number of other political rights are contingent on being an eligible voter, including the
right to run for office and to sponsor a voter's initiative. Id. §§ 29.15.010; 29.79.010.
27. Id. § 9.41.040(1)(b)(i).
28. See infra footnotes 39-47 and accompanying text.
29. See infra footnotes 68-72 and accompanying text.
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A. Washington Denies Offenders the Right to Vote Unless Their Civil
Rights Have Been Restored, Which Only Occurs Upon Payment of
All Legal-Financial Obligations
The Washington State Constitution denies persons convicted of
"infamous crimes" the right to vote unless their civil rights have been
restored.30 Washington law defines "infamous crime" as "a crime
punishable by death in the state penitentiary or imprisonment in a state
correctional facility."'" All felony crimes in Washington are captured
under this definition. 2 Convicted felons' civil rights are restored if they
complete all the requirements of their sentence, including paying legal-
financial obligations,33 or if they receive a pardon from the governor.34
When offenders complete all aspects of their sentence, the sentencing
court issues a certificate of discharge. 5 A discharge automatically
restores an offender's civil rights, and the certificate of discharge must
state that the offender's civil rights have been restored.36
Washington's civil rights restoration process reinstates all rights,
including voting, "lost by operation of law upon conviction. 37 Besides
the right to vote,3" the only rights "lost by operation of law" are the right
to serve on a jury39 and the right to bear arms.40 The U.S. Supreme Court
has established that voting is a fundamental right protected by the U.S.
Constitution.4 However, the Court has not construed the right to serve on
30. WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 29.01.080 (2002).
32. Id. § 9A.20.021(10).
33. Id. §§ 9.96.050; 9.94A.637.
34. Id. § 9.96.010. Section 9.96.020 provides that the governor may restore felons' civil rights by
signing a civil rights restoration certificate. However, although the statute remains valid, the civil
rights restoration by the governor was essentially supplanted by the Sentencing Reform Act's
process of civil rights restoration upon discharge. Id. § 9.94A.637. Personal correspondence with
Everett Billingslea, Counsel to Governor Gary Locke. (On file with the author). Consequently,
current Governor Gary Locke does not restore civil rights for Washington offenders, but instead
refers them to the sentencing court. Id.
35. Id.
36. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.637(3) (2002).
37. Id.
38. WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3; WASH. REV. CODE § 29.10.097 (2002).
39. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.36.070.
40. Id. § 9.41.040(1)(b)(i).




a jury or the right of individuals to bear arms as fundamental rights.42
Likewise, the Washington Supreme Court has not discussed the right to
serve on a jury and has stopped short of applying fundamental status to
the Washington State Constitution's right to bear arms.43  Fundamental
rights other than voting, such as the right to free speech and the right to
be free from unreasonable search and seizure," are not entirely lost upon
conviction, and their restoration is not contingent on payment of legal-
financial obligations.45 Instead, other fundamental rights are only
restricted during incarceration and parole when necessary to advance
"legitimate penological interests." '46 Consequently, the only fundamental
right restored through the civil rights restoration process, and thus the
only fundamental right conditioned on the payment of legal-financial
obligations, is an offender's right to vote.47
Washington's constitutional history does not provide a rationale for
denying offenders of the fundamental right to vote,4" nor does the
legislative record provide an explanation for requiring felons to pay
legal-financial obligations prior to regaining the franchise.49 Other courts
42. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding that the Second Amendment is a
right held by the states and does not protect the possession of a weapon by private citizens).
43. State v. Krantz, 24 Wash. 2d 350, 353, 164 P.2d 453, 454 (1945) (upholding a Washington
statute prohibiting persons convicted of crimes from possessing pistols).
44. Rights protected by the Constitution's Bill of Rights are fundamental. JOHN E. NOwAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1002 (6th ed. 2000).
45. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S 78, 85 (1987).
46. Id. at 89.
47. Even though the right to bear arms is not fundamental, most offenders' right to possess
firearms may be restored regardless of whether they have paid their legal-financial obligations.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.040(4)(b)(i) (2002). With or without payment of legal-financial
obligations, most offenders can petition the sentencing court for the restoration of their right to
possess a firearm if they have lived in the community for five or more consecutive years without
being convicted of another crime. Id. Thus, offenders who have not paid their legal-financial
obligations may have their right to possess a firearm restored, yet their right to vote-a fundamental
right-will be denied because their sentence has not been discharged.
48. Washington's first disenfranchisement law was passed in 1866, when Washington was a
territory. State v. Collin, 69 Wash. 268, 270 (1912). This law was incorporated into the Washington
Constitution as Article VI, section 3 at the Constitutional Convention of 1889. Id. However, the
delegates added the phrase "unless restored to civil rights" upon a separate motion. BEVERLY
PAULIK ROSENOw, THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
1889, 638-39 (1962). The limited history that does exist from the Constitutional Convention does
not describe the discussions surrounding felon disenfranchisement or the addition of the civil rights
restoration provision. Id.; see also ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 122-23 (2002).
49. The requirement that offenders satisfy all conditions of their sentence, including payment of
legal-financial obligations, before restoration of civil rights is part of the Sentencing Reform Act of
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and commentators have attributed state felon disenfranchisement laws to
a state's interest in promoting responsible use of the ballot." However,
no published court opinion or commentator has discussed states'
rationales for requiring felons to pay their legal-financial obligations
before regaining the right to vote.
B. Washington Courts Assess Legal-Financial Obligations at
Sentencing, and Failure to Pay Legal-Financial Obligations May
Result in Civil or Criminal Sanctions
When a person is convicted of a felony in Washington, the court must
order the payment of legal-financial obligations as a part of the
offender's sentence.5 There are many different kinds of legal-financial
obligations imposed in Washington, but the most common 52  are
restitution, 53 a victim penalty assessment, 54 trial court costs,55 fines, 56 and
local drug penalties.57 The sentencing court must impose a five hundred-
1981. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.637 (2002). The 1981 Final Legislative Report, Legislative Digest
and History of Bills of the Senate and House, House Journal, and Senate Journal, all published by
the Washington State Legislature, reveal no discussion of the restoration of civil rights upon
completion of a sentence or of requiring payment of legal-financial obligations prior to restoration of
civil rights.
50. See Shepard v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that felons, "like insane
persons[,] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Green v. Bd. of Elections,
380 F.2d 445, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1967) (stating that allowing felons to vote may lead to political
corruption); Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 159, 172 (2001) (arguing that
felons should be denied the right to vote because their criminal acts call into question their
trustworthiness and loyalty); Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-felons: Citizenship, Criminality,
and "the Purity of the Ballot Box," 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1305-09 (1989) (surveying the
justifications for felon disenfranchisement); ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE
CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 162-63 (2000) (discussing historical
justifications for felon disenfranchisement).
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760 (2002).
52. STATE OF WASHINGTON SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW
AND EVALUATION OF SENTENCING POLICY IN WASHINGTON STATE: 2000-2001, 57 (2001)
[hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW] (highlighting the most common forms of legal-financial
obligations).
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.753 (2002).
54. Id. § 7.68.035.
55. Id. § 10.01.160.
56. Id. § 9.94A.550.
57. The trial court may impose county or interlocal drug penalties at its discretion. See WASH.
REV. CODE 9.94A.030(27); State v. Hunter, 102 Wash. App. 630, 634-35, 9 P.3d 872, 876 (2000).
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dollar victim penalty assessment in all felony cases, 8 and restitution is
mandatory where the crime results in harm to person or property. 9 Most
other legal-financial obligations may be ordered at the discretion of the
court or are mandatory only to the extent that the offender is able to
pay.60 Consequently, regardless of financial condition, every person
convicted of a felony in Washington is assessed at least five hundred
dollars in legal-financial obligations.
At sentencing, the court must establish a payment schedule based on
the offender's financial resources.6' The offender must abide by the
payment schedule to avoid further sanctions.62 From the date of
sentencing, offenders are charged interest on their unpaid legal-financial
obligations at a minimum rate of twelve percent per year.63 If offenders
fall behind in their payments, the state may pursue a number of debt
collection devices, including garnishment of wages.6' Additionally, the
sentencing court and the DOC may impose sanctions, such as jail time or
community service, if offenders willfully fail to pay legal-financial
obligations.65
C. Legal-Financial Obligations Present a Substantial Hurdle to the
Restoration of Offenders' Voting Rights
Many offenders have a difficult time meeting their legal-financial
obligation requirements. Indigent offenders who are never able to pay are
58. State v. Curry, 118 Wash. 2d 911, 917, 829 P.2d 166, 186 (1992) (holding that the victim
penalty assessment is mandatory because there is no statutory provision for waiver).
59. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.753 (2002). Restitution must be ordered by the court in cases of
damage to property or injury to person "unless extraordinary circumstances exist which make
restitution inappropriate in the court's judgment." Id.
60. For example, trial court costs and fines are assessed at the discretion of the court. Id.
§ 10.01.160. Also, the Department of Corrections (DOC) supervision fees are mandatory but may be
waived if the offender is unable to pay because of unemployment, handicap, or other extenuating
circumstances that make payment difficult. Id. § 9.94A.780 (2002).
61. Id. § 9.94A.760(l). If the court does not set a payment schedule, the DOC must set one. Id.
62. Id. §§ 9.94A.634(3)(a)(i); 9.94A.634(3)(c).
63. Interest on criminal judgments accrues at the same rate as that required for civil judgments,
and accrues at the highest rate permitted by law. See id. §§ 10.82.090; 4.56.110. The maximum
interested rate permitted by law is the higher of: (1) 12% or (2) the rate of a 26-week T-bill plus four
percent. Id. § 19.52.020.
64. Id. § 9.94A.760(3).
65. Id. §§ 9.94A.634(3)(a)(i); 9.94A.634(3)(c).
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permanently ineligible for re-enfranchisement 6 While the DOC and
county courts track overall collection rates, they do not record how much
the average offender is required to pay or how many offenders have
difficulty paying their legal-financial obligations.67 The limited evidence
available regarding offenders' ability to pay suggests that thousands of
offenders in Washington are currently unable to receive a discharge, and
thus are ineligible for re-enfranchisement, because they cannot pay their
legal-financial obligations. In a fiscal note to a 2002 Washington State
Senate bill, the DOC estimated that as of December 31, 2001, about
46,500 offenders had completed all the requirements of their sentences
except for paying their legal-financial obligations.8 Additionally,
approximately ninety percent of the offenders who appear before the
sentencing court for failure to pay legal-financial obligations qualify for
a public defender,69 which means that they are at or below 125 percent of
the federal poverty line.7" The high rate of indigency among offenders
who are delinquent in making their legal-financial obligation payments
suggests that they simply lack the financial resources to meet their
payment schedule. Data on collection rates also supports this conclusion.
The DOC reports that in the year 2000 it collected only twenty eight
percent of the assessed legal-financial obligations.7 Of the mandatory
victim penalty assessments imposed between 1995 and 2000, the DOC
reports that it collected just 25.4 percent.72
In sum, convicted felons in Washington cannot regain voting rights
until they have paid all legal-financial obligations imposed at sentencing.
Therefore, although Washington has a process for restoring offenders'
voting rights, that process is foreclosed to many offenders because they
lack the financial resources to pay their debts. The U.S. Supreme Court's
voting rights case law,73 along with its opinions regarding other
66. If offenders do not pay their legal financial obligations they are ineligible for a sentence
discharge; a discharge is a pre-requisite for re-enfranchisement. WASH. REV. CODE §9.94A.637
(2002).
67. Telephone Interview with Barbara Miner, Director of King County Clerk's Office (July 10,
2002).
68. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AGENCY FISCAL NOTE FOR SENATE BILL 6519 (2002).
69. DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY, TRADE, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT FISCAL NOTE FOR HOUSE BILL 2712 (2002).
70. Maureen O'Hagan, Public Defenders Work for Nonprofits, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 15,
2002, at B8.
71. COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW, supra note 52, at 56-57.
72. Id.
73. See infra Section II.
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fundamental rights,74 suggest Washington's bar on voting for failure to
pay legal-financial obligations violates the Equal Protection Clause."
The following sections investigate this possibility.
II. VOTING IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT SECURED BY THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Although the right to vote is not explicitly guaranteed in the text of the
U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that once states grant
citizens the right to vote, it becomes a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution.76 As a fundamental right, state laws alleged to restrict
voting rights must survive strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.7' To satisfy strict scrutiny, state laws must treat all citizens alike
when providing the right to vote, unless disparate treatment is necessary
to advance a compelling governmental interest.78
A. Once Granted by the State, the Right to Vote is Fundamental
Neither the text of the U.S. Constitution nor any constitutional
amendment contains an affirmative grant of the right to vote, 79 and until
the mid-twentieth century voting was not considered a fundamental
right.80 The Constitution scarcely mentions voting,8' and the amendments
that address voting rights do so only in negative terms, providing that the
right to vote "shall not be abridged or denied" on account of race, 2 sex, 3
age,"4 or payment of a poll tax.85 During the nineteenth century, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that "the Constitution of the United States has not
74. See infra Section IV.
75. See infra Section V.
76. Id.
77. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
78. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
79. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 46 (2001).
80. Id.
81. The only mention of citizen electoral rights is in Article I, section 2 which states "The House
of Representatives shall be... chosen every second Year by the People of the several States ......
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
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conferred the right to vote upon any one." 6 Nonetheless, following the
Civil War the Court began to recognize that voting was one of a citizen's
most important political rights. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,87 the Court stated
that, "[t]hough not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege
merely conceded by society ... [voting] is regarded as a fundamental
political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights." 8 During the first
half of the twentieth century, the Court did not address the constitutional
status of voting rights but instead focused on the problem of
disenfranchisement of African Americans. 9 Then, in a series of cases
between 1959 and 1969, the Court expanded the scope of the right to
vote and declared voting a "fundamental matter in a free and democratic
society."9
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the fundamental right to vote is
implied in the U.S. Constitution's structure and arises once states provide
citizens with the opportunity to vote.9' In Wesberry v. Sanders,92 the
Court stated that "our Constitution leaves no room for classification of
people in a way that unnecessarily abridges" the right to vote because
"[n]o right is more precious in a free country than having a voice in the
election of those who make the laws .... Other rights, even the most
basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined."93 The Court has
acknowledged that states may determine the conditions under which the
right to vote can be exercised,94 but it has held that once states grant
voting rights to their citizens they must not do so in a discriminatory
manner.95 Upon granting the franchise, states must treat all eligible voters
similarly, unless disparate treatment is necessary to advance a
compelling interest.96
86. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875).
87. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
88. Id. at 370.
89. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 79, at 46.
90. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). See also Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964).
91. Harper, 383 U.S. at 665.
92. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
93. Id. at 17-18.
94. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959).
95. Harper, 383 U.S. at 665.




B. State Laws Infringing on the Fundamental Right to Vote Are
Subject to Strict Scrutiny
The Equal Protection Clause forbids states from treating similarly
situated people differently,97 but there is no universal standard for
determining whether a state law inappropriately imposes disparate
treatment.98 Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court employs three standards of
review for Equal Protection challenges: strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, and rational basis scrutiny.99 Courts reviewing an Equal
Protection challenge must chose between these standards based on the
answers to two initial questions."° First, on what basis does the law
classify groups of people for disparate treatment?'' Second, what right is
at stake?'0 2
Laws challenged under the Equal Protection Clause receive strict
scrutiny-the most intensive level of review-if the law involves
disparate treatment based on suspect classifications such as race"0 3 or if
the disparate treatment threatens a fundamental right."° Under strict
scrutiny, courts will strike down state laws unless they are narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest.'0 5 Laws receive
97. City of Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
98. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 335 (highlighting the three considerations encompassed within these
two questions).
99. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 44, at 639.
100. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 335.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized race, alienage, and national origin as suspect
classifications requiring strict scrutiny. City of Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
440 (1985). See also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 44, at 640. The Court has declined to extend
the suspect classification label to other groups of people, including the disabled and the poor. See
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439 (people with disabilities); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1,28-29 (1973) (families with low incomes).
104. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1454 (2d ed. 1988). Fundamental
rights which invoke strict scrutiny include, inter alia, the right to vote, the right to marry, the right to
travel, and those rights explicitly protected in the Bill of Rights. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336 (right to
vote); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (right to marry); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (right to travel); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 44, at 1002 (rights protected
in the Bill of Rights).
105. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 921 (1995). At times, the U.S. Supreme Court has used the
word "necessary" rather than "narrowly tailored" in its articulations of the strict scrutiny test. See
Dunn, 405 U.S. at 337. Both expressions of the strict scrutiny test capture the spirit of the Court's
standard-that the restriction must not merely advance the compelling state interest but must be
essential to its achievement-and are used interchangeably throughout this Comment.
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intermediate scrutiny if they involve classifications that require
heightened judicial review but are not "suspect" and do not implicate a
fundamental right." 6 To survive intermediate scrutiny, state laws must
substantially further an important governmental interest." 7 All other
challenges receive rational basis scrutiny, which requires state laws to be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.'0 8
Regardless of the basis for classification, voting laws receive strict
scrutiny because they implicate a fundamental right.'0 9 Under the strict
scrutiny standard, laws that impose voter qualifications will be struck
down unless they are necessary to advance a compelling governmental
interest."0 In Reynolds v. Sims,"' the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
voting as a fundamental right and directed courts to apply strict scrutiny,
stating "any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be
carefully and meticulously scrutinized."".2 Further, in Buckley v. Valeo, 3
the Court stated that restrictions on the electoral process must survive
"exacting scrutiny"''" and will only be sustained if they further a "vital
governmental interest."'"5 The Court has struck down a number of voter
qualifications on Equal Protection grounds because the qualifications
imposed conditions that were not narrowly tailored to advance
compelling governmental interests." 6 For example, the Court has
invalidated voter qualifications that established a requirement of
wealth," 7 required residents to pay property taxes in order to vote in
school board elections,"' excluded residents based on military status," 9
or imposed lengthy residency requirements. 20
106. TRIBE, supra note 104, at 1613. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized gender and
illegitimacy as classifications that require intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 1614.
107. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
108. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450,457-58 (1988).
109. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 79, at 303-05.
110. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 337.
111. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
112. Id.
113. 424 U.S. 1 (1974).
114. Id. at 93-94.
115. Id.
116. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1,5 (1971).
117. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
118. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621,622 (1969).
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In sum, since the mid-twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court has
upheld citizens' fundamental right to vote and permitted only those voter
qualifications that are narrowly tailored to advance a compelling
governmental interest. Most state voting rights restrictions have been
struck down as unnecessary infringements on a fundamental right.
However, as the next section illustrates, the Court has permitted one
exception to the rule that states cannot treat citizens differently with
respect to voting rights: states can exclude from the franchise citizens
convicted of crimes.
21
III. STATES CAN DISENFRANCHISE OFFENDERS UPON
CONVICTION, BUT THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS NOT
YET DECIDED THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR FELON RE-ENFRANCHISEMENT
Although the right to vote is fundamental, states may restrict
offenders' right to vote without running afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause if disenfranchisement laws are not otherwise discriminatory. 22
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed the Equal
Protection Clause's requirements for felon re-enfranchisement laws.
Interpreting Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court in
Ramirez permitted states to deny the right to vote to persons convicted of
crimes."' Under Ramirez, states do not violate the Equal Protection
Clause when they distinguish for voting rights purposes between citizens
who have committed crimes and those who have not. 24 However, in
Hunter v. Underwood,25  the Court clarified that felon
disenfranchisement laws are not entirely immune from all Equal
Protection challenges. 26 State disenfranchisement laws violate the Equal
Protection Clause if the laws discriminate on a basis other than offender
119. Carrington v. Rush, 380 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1965) (striking down a Texas constitutional
provision prohibiting members of the armed forces who move to Texas during the course of military
duty from voting while they remain in the military).
120. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972).
121. See infra Section IlI.A.
122. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
123. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974).
124. Id.
125. 471 U.S 222 (1985).
126. Id. at 233.
Washington Law Review
status."' The Court has not decided whether states, when re-
enfranchising offenders, are permitted to make distinctions using
classifications such as race or economic status that cannot be used when
granting the initial right to vote.
A. The U.S. Constitution Permits States to Deny Voting Rights to
Citizens Convicted of Crimes
A state's ability to deny felons the right to vote is derived from
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to Section 2,
"representatives will be apportioned among the several States according
to their respective numbers."' States that deny the right to vote to any
eligible male "except for participation in rebellion, or other crime" will
have their representation reduced in proportion to the number of persons
denied the right to vote.'29 Based on the explicit exception of criminal
convictions for apportionment purposes, the U.S. Supreme Court
concluded in Ramirez that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
implicitly authorizes states to deny the right to vote to persons convicted
of crimes. 30
In Ramirez, three California residents convicted of felonies sued their
county clerk for refusing to register them to vote.' 3 ' They argued that
California's felon disenfranchisement law violated the Equal Protection
Clause because it denied them the right vote while granting it to all other
residents.'32 Their claim rested on prior U.S. Supreme Court voting rights
cases, which held that states could not impose voter qualifications that
distinguish between different groups of eligible voters based on
irrelevant factors.'33 However, the Supreme Court's opinion in Ramirez,
relying on the text and original intent of Section 2 of the Fourteenth
127. Id.
128. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
129. Id.
130. 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974).
131. Id. at 31-33.
132. Id. at 33. The plaintiffs also claimed that California's felon disenfranchisement laws violated
the Equal Protection Clause because county clerks throughout the state were inconsistent in their
application of the felon disenfranchisement law, thereby arbitrarily granting some felons but not
others voting rights. Id. Because the California Supreme Court had not considered this claim, the
U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration of whether the counties' implementation of




Amendment, held that states do not violate the Equal Protection Clause
when they disenfranchise felons based on their status as offenders.'34
B. Felon Disenfranchisement Laws May Violate the Equal Protection
Clause When They Are Otherwise Discriminatory
A decade after Ramirez, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that state
disenfranchisement laws can violate the Equal Protection Clause if the
laws disenfranchised offenders on a basis other than criminal
conviction.'35  In Hunter v. Underwood, citizens convicted of
misdemeanor crimes challenged an Alabama constitutional provision that
disenfranchised persons convicted of crimes "involving moral
turpitude."'36 Alabama's definition of crimes of "moral turpitude"
included misdemeanor offenses such as presenting a worthless check and
petty larceny, but excluded more serious offenses such as second-degree
manslaughter and assault on a police officer.'37 The plaintiffs argued that
the selection of crimes "involving moral turpitude" was racially
discriminatory, intending to disenfranchise blacks more often than
whites. 38 The Court struck down Alabama's law, citing the unusual
selection of crimes'3 9 and legislative history demonstrating that the
constitutional provision was enacted with the purpose of disenfranchising
blacks. 40 The Hunter Court held that felon disenfranchisement laws that
are enacted with "the desire to discriminate" against persons on account
of race and that in fact have a discriminatory effect violate the Equal
Protection Clause.'4
The explicit holding of the Court in Hunter-that felon
disenfranchisement laws violate the Equal Protection Clause if they are
134. Id. at 54.
135. 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985). In Ramirez, the Court suggested, but did not decide, that felon
disenfranchisement laws violate the Equal Protection Clause if otherwise discriminatory when it
remanded the case to the California Supreme Court for consideration of whether California's
implementation of its disenfranchisement law was arbitrary and therefore violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 418 U.S. at 56. See also supra note 132.
136. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 223 (quoting the ALA. CONST. § 182 (1901)).
137. Id. at 226-27.
138. Id. at 224.
139. Id. at227.
140. Id. at 229-30.
141. Id. at 233.
Washington Law Review
racially discriminatory 4 ---suggests that where felon disenfranchisement
laws are discriminatory on any basis other than offender status, they must
survive a traditional Equal Protection analysis. To resolve the plaintiffs'
Fourteenth Amendment claim, the Hunter Court did not first discuss
Ramirez or disenfranchisement laws' immunity from Equal Protection
challenges, but instead began with a traditional Equal Protection
analysis.'43 Furthermore, at the end of its analysis, the Court noted that its
decision was entirely consistent with the Ramirez decision because "§ 2
was not designed to permit... purposeful racial discrimination ....,,"
The Hunter Court's willingness to entertain an Equal Protection
challenge based on racial discrimination without first considering the
specific requirements of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
demonstrates that felon disenfranchisement laws are not entirely immune
from Equal Protection scrutiny.
45
C. The U.S. Supreme Court Has Not Considered the Constitutional
Requirements of Felon Re-Enfranchisement Laws
The constitutional requirements of felon re-enfranchisement remain an
unsettled area of law because both Ramirez and Hunter exclusively
addressed felon disenfranchisement. Ramirez considered whether states,
under the crime exception in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
could deny felons the right to vote while granting it to all other
citizens.'46 Hunter dealt with a state's initial decision about which crimes
would fall under Section 2's crime exception and clarified that the state
may not make those determinations for discriminatory reasons.'47
Ramirez and Hunter leave unanswered the central constitutional question
of felon re-enfranchisement: whether states, when re-granting voting
rights, can distinguish among offenders by imposing qualifications that
would otherwise violate the Equal Protection Clause's voting rights
requirements.
Although no U.S. Supreme Court opinion has addressed the
constitutionality of felon re-enfranchisement requirements, recently in
142. Id.
143. Id. at 227-28.
144. Id. at 233.
145. Id. at 227-28.
146. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55 (1974).
147. Hunter, 417 U.S. at 233.
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Johnson v. Bush,14 a federal district court in the Southern District of
Florida considered whether a requirement that offenders pay restitution
before becoming eligible for re-enfranchisement amounted to an
unconstitutional poll tax. 49 Plaintiffs challenged that the restitution
requirement was a poll tax equivalent, and therefore violated the
Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments, as well as the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.150 The federal district court did not consider the three
bases of the plaintiffs' challenge separately, and merely held that Florida
was entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's poll tax claims.' To
support its grant of summary judgment, the Johnson court noted that
Florida's restitution requirement was unlike traditional poll taxes because
it was a part of Florida's civil rights restoration process rather than a
requirement for voter registration or a restraint on exercise of the
franchise. 52 In addition, according to the Johnson court, payment of
restitution is related to an offender's "readiness to return to the
electorate" and therefore is not an unconstitutional poll tax. 3 Moreover,
the court suggested that upon conviction felons lose all stake in the right
to vote, and consequently any decision by Florida to restore voting rights
does not invoke constitutional protections.
5 4
148. 214 F. Supp. 2d. 1333 (S.D. Fla 2002).
149. Id. at 1342-43. The Johnson court has been the only court to consider whether a requirement
that offenders pay money as a prerequisite to the restoration of voting rights violates the Equal
Protection Clause. The Second Circuit, in a case opinion pre-dating Hunter and Ramirez, did
consider whether offenders could challenge the constitutionality of state laws which require the
payment of a fee for restoration of voting rights, but did not decide whether such requirements
actually violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Bynum v. Conn. Comm'n on Forfeited Rights, 410
F.2d 173, 175-76 (2d Cir. 1969). In holding that the plaintiff's challenge was valid, the Second
Circuit reasoned "[t]he focal question is whether [a state], once having agreed to permit ex-felons to
regain their vote and having established administrative machinery for this purpose, can deny access
to this relief solely because one is too poor to pay the required fee." Id. The Second Circuit referred
the case to a three-judge panel, which never produced an opinion on the validity of Connecticut's re-
enfranchisement requirements. Id. at 177. The Connecticut Legislature later repealed the re-
enfranchisement statute that required payment of a fee. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-48 (2001). More
recently, the Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, rejected without much discussion the
plaintiff's claim that Virginia's requirement that offenders pay money to apply for the restoration of
their voting rights violated the Twenty-Fourth Amendment's prohibition against poll taxes. See
Howard v. Gilmore, No. 99-2285, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2680, at *4 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2000). The
Fourth Circuit did not examine the re-enfranchisement requirements under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Id.
150. Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d. at 1343.
151. Id. at 1342.




Though the Johnson court held that Florida's restitution requirement
was not a poll tax, the court, like the U.S. Supreme Court, did not
directly decide the central question of felon re-enfranchisement. Can
states, in their re-enfranchisement laws, distinguish between groups of
felons in ways that otherwise violate the voting rights requirements of
the Equal Protection Clause? The U.S. Supreme Court's opinions in
analogous areas of law, explored in the next section, are helpful in
answering this question.
IV. STATES CANNOT RESTRICT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
BASED ON AN INABILITY TO PAY MONEY TO THE STATE
WITHOUT ADVANCING A COMPELLING INTEREST
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not decided the requirements
for felon re-enfranchisement laws, it has addressed restrictions of other
fundamental rights based on an inability to pay. First, with respect to
voting rights, the Court has held that states cannot condition voting on
financial resources or payment of money to the state.'55 Second, outside
the context of voting, the Court has held that states may not condition
offenders' fundamental rights on the payment of legal-financial
obligations and court costs.'56 Third, addressing fundamental rights more
generally, the Court has held that states may not restrict citizens'
fundamental rights because of a failure to pay pre-existing debt.'57 In
addition, restricting fundamental rights to serve the state's "debt
collection" interests is unconstitutional where the state has equally
effective, yet less restrictive options available." 8
A. States May Not Impose Voter Qualifications Based on Payment of
Money to the State or an Individual's Affluence
Voter qualifications that require citizens to pay money to the state,
most often identified with a poll tax requirement, violate the Equal
Protection Clause.'59 Poll tax requirements are taxes, or the functional
equivalent, that burden the exercise of an individual's right to vote. Poll
155. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
156. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
157. Zablocki v. Redhail, 424 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
158. Id. at 389-90; Williams, 399 U.S. at 245.
159. Harper, 383 U.S. at 665.
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taxes violate the Fourteenth 6' and Twenty-Fourth Amendments 6' of the
U.S. Constitution, as well as the Voting Rights Act of 1965.62 Moreover,
the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the Fourteenth Amendment's
voting rights requirements prohibit more than explicit poll taxes,
extending to any state requirement that introduces affluence as a
qualification of voting.6 3
In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,'64 the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down a Virginia law requiring voters to pay a $1.50 poll tax in
order to vote in state elections.'65 According to the Court, a state's
interest in voting is limited to the power to fix voter qualifications that
"promote the intelligent use of the ballot.' 66 Because "wealth, like race,
creed or color, is not germane to one's ability to participate intelligently
in the electoral process," states that introduce "wealth or payment of a
fee as a measure of a voter's qualification.. . introduce a capricious and
irrelevant factor."' 67 Therefore, the Court concluded that distinguishing
among citizens based on their ability to pay by conditioning voting on
affluence or the payment of money violates the Equal Protection
Clause. 68 In addition, the Court emphasized that voter qualifications
based on affluence violate the Constitution no mater how large or small
the degree of resulting discrimination. 69  To the Court, any
discrimination based on financial condition is unacceptable. 7
160. Id. at 666.
161. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of a state poll tax or any other tax to "deny
or abridge" the right of citizens to vote in federal primary and general elections. U.S. CONST. amend.
XXIV. In Harman v. Forssenius, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Twenty-Fourth Amendment
also prohibits requirements that are the functional equivalent of a poll tax. 380 U.S. 528, 540-41
(1965).
162. Congress, exercising its powers under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Twenty-Fourth
Amendments, prohibited the payment of a poll tax as a precondition for voting in Section 10 of the
Voting Rights Act. See 42 USC § 1973(h) (2002).
163. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666.
164. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
165. Id. at 668. Harper was decided two years after the passage of the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment in 1964, which prohibited the collection of poll taxes in federal elections. U.S. CONST.
amend. XXIV. Poll tax requirements for state elections were valid until the Court's decision in
Harper. 383 U.S. at 666.
166. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666.
167. Id. at 668.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 665.
170. Id.
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B. States Cannot Distinguish Between Groups of Offenders Based on
Their Ability to Pay Where Fundamental Rights Are at Stake
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has permitted distinctions between
offenders and other citizens for voting rights purposes, it has been less
tolerant of distinctions between groups of offenders, especially where the
distinctions fall along economic lines. The Court has held that the length
of offenders' incarceration may not be conditioned on their ability to pay
legal-financial obligations. 7' Furthermore, the Court has held that
although states are not constitutionally required to provide appellate
courts, if they do provide appellate review, it cannot be based on
offenders' ability to pay money. 72
1. States Cannot Prevent Offenders from Regaining Their Liberty
Because They Are Unable to Pay Legal-Financial Obligations
States cannot restrict offenders' liberty longer than the maximum time
permitted by statute because they are unable to pay the legal-financial
obligations imposed at sentencing. 73 In Williams v. Illinois, 74 the Court
invalidated an Illinois law requiring indigent offenders who were unable
to pay their legal-financial obligations to remain in prison until they had
worked off their debts. 75 According to the Court, the Illinois requirement
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it determined which
offenders would be released and which ones would not based on an
ability to pay. 76 Although the Court recognized that "the sentence was
not imposed upon appellant because of his indigency but because he had
committed a crime," the Court held the law was nonetheless
discriminatory because it presented some offenders with the opportunity
to regain their freedom while effectively denying the same opportunity to
other offenders because of their economic circumstances. 77
The Williams Court acknowledged that judges have considerable
discretion when sentencing offenders and may take into account a wide
171. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244 (1970).
172. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
173. Williams, 399 U.S. at 243.
174. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
175. Id. at 243-44.
176. Id. at 244.
177. Id. at 242.
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range of factors.'78 According to the Court, however, the Illinois law
went beyond sentencing discretion to punish some offenders longer-
beyond even the statutory maximum-solely based on their financial
condition.'79 The Court noted that Illinois had imposed "different
consequences on two categories of persons" and held that "the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that the statutory ceiling placed on
imprisonment for any substantive offence be the same for all defendants
irrespective of their economic status."'80 In later cases, the Court has
construed its holding in Williams as prohibiting states from imposing a
fine and then converting it to jail time because the offender does not have
the financial resources to pay the fine.'8 '
At the conclusion of it's constitutional analysis, the Court recognized
that preventing states from incarcerating offenders for failure to pay
legal-financial obligations would make collection somewhat more
difficult, but the Court noted that it would not eliminates a state's ability
to collect the debts altogether.' Dismissing the added burden to the
state, the Court stated "the constitutional imperatives of the Equal
Protection Clause must have priority.... ." over the state's
inconvenience.'83 Further, the Court reasoned that "administrative
inconvenience would be minimal" because states have a wide variety of
other debt collection options available that do not restrict offenders'
liberty through additional incarceration.' Consequently, in Williams, the
Court held that the denial of liberty through continued incarceration was
unnecessary to advance the state's debt collection interest.18 5
178. Id. at 243.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 244.
181. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971). Further, in Bearden v. Georgia the Court held that
due process prohibits states from incarcerating offenders for failure to pay legal-financial obligations
without inquiring into the willfulness of the nonpayment and without considering alternative forms
of punishment that do not restrict liberty interests. 461 U.S. 660, 672-73 (1983). The Court stated
that automatic incarceration violates the Fourteenth Amendment because it is fundamentally unfair
to incarcerate offenders solely because they lack the financial resources to pay their legal-financial
obligations. Id.
182. Williams, 399 U.S. at 245.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 244-45.
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2. States Cannot Restrict Offenders 'Access to Appellate Review
Based on Their Inability to Pay Court Costs
The fundamental right of offenders to access the courts may not be
constrained by an inability to pay court costs. 8 ' In Griffin v. Illinois,'87
the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois law that required
defendants challenging a criminal conviction to purchase a copy of their
trial court transcript. 8 8 According to the Court, Illinois' law violated the
Fourteenth Amendment because "there can be no equal justice where the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."' 89
As in the voting rights cases, 90 the Court held in Griffin that, although
the right to access state courts is not mandated in the text of the U.S.
Constitution, an offender's right to access appellate review is
constitutionally required where the state provides an appellate court
system.'9 ' The Court emphasized that states cannot provide for appellate
review "in a way that discriminates against some convicted defendants
on account of their poverty" because the ability to pay costs "bear[s] no
rational relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence.' 92 As a result of
the Court's decision in Griffin, distinctions between convicted
defendants based on financial condition, which have the effect of
restricting poor defendants' access to the court system, violate the Equal
Protection Clause. 193
186. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
187. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
188. Id.
189. Id. Seven years later, the Court extended the principle in Griffin by holding that states must
also provide indigent defendants counsel for their first appeal of right. Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963). However, in Ross v. Moffitt, the Court declined to extend this right to
discretionary appeals. 417 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1974).
190. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966); see also supra notes 91-
95 and accompanying text.
191. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18.




C. States Cannot Condition Fundamental Rights on the Payment of
Pre-existing Debts Unless the Restriction is Necessary to Advance
a Compelling State Interest
Courts apply strict scrutiny review to laws that restrict fundamental
rights by imposing payment requirements.'94 To survive strict scrutiny, a
restriction must be necessary to advance a compelling state interest and
be narrowly tailored to effectuate only that interest.'95 The U.S. Supreme
Court set forth these principles in Zablocki v. Redhail, '96 a case in which
plaintiffs argued that a Wisconsin statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause because it restricted the fundamental right to marry. 197
Wisconsin's law required marriage license applicants to be current in
child support payments and to demonstrate that their children would not
become public charges. 9 ' The Court agreed with the plaintiffs,
concluding that the statute was an impermissible restraint on the
fundamental right to marry.' 99 The Court held that Wisconsin's law failed
strict scrutiny because it was not necessary to advance the state's interest
collecting child support, nor was it narrowly tailored to advance only thatinterest.2°°
Holding that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause, the
Zablocki Court recognized that the denial of a marriage license was a
broad restriction that, at best, provided the state with an indirect method
of child support collection.2 ' The Court noted that the state's act of
denying marriage licenses to those who were delinquent in child support
payments may have pressured some people to pay, but the denial did not
in itself increase the amount of money Wisconsin collected.2 2 The only
direct effect of Wisconsin's law was the restriction of a fundamental
right.23 According to the Court, the indirect pressures were unnecessary
194. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 381, 388 (1978).
195. Id. at 387.
196. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
197. Id. at 379.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 388. See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that state laws
denying divorce to married couples based on an inability to pay court costs unconstitutionally
restricts the fundamental right to marry).





in part because Wisconsin already had a number of other, "at least as
effective" options for encouraging payment of child support obligations,
including garnishment of wages, civil contempt proceedings, and
criminal penalties.2 4
As illustrated above, in a variety of contexts, the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that fundamental rights may not be conditioned on the ability to
pay money to the state. The Court's insistence that the right to vote, the
right to liberty, the right of access to the courts, and the right to marry
cannot be conditioned on one's financial resources suggests that
offenders' voting rights also cannot be conditioned on their ability to pay
money to the state. The following section draws on these analogies to
argue that Washington's re-enfranchisement law, which requires
offenders to pay their legal-financial obligations before regaining their
voting rights, violates the Equal Protection Clause.2 5
V. WASHINGTON'S FELON RE-ENFRANCHISEMENT LAW
VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE BECAUSE
IT CONDITIONS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT ON THE
PAYMENT OF MONEY TO THE STATE
Washington State's requirement that offenders pay their legal-
financial obligations before re-enfranchisement violates the Equal
Protection Clause because it conditions the right to vote on offenders'
ability to pay. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ramirez permits
Washington to distinguish between offenders and other citizens through
felon disenfranchisement laws, 26 but it does not address re-
enfranchisement. Although the constitutional requirements of re-
enfranchisement laws are undetermined, the Court has suggested that
ordinary Equal Protection principles apply where voting rights laws
discriminate on a basis other than criminal conviction.2 7 Washington's
re-enfranchisement law impermissibly distinguishes among offenders
based on their economic circumstances, rather than permissibly
distinguishing between offenders and other citizens based on their status
204. Id. at. 389-90.
205. See infra Section V.B and V.C.
206. Ramirez v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974); see also supra notes 130-34 and
accompanying text.




as an offender.2"' Because Washington's re-enfranchisement law
implicates the fundamental right to vote, it must withstand strict
scrutiny.2"9 Washington's re-enfranchisement law fails strict scrutiny
because it is not narrowly tailored to achieve Washington's interests in
debt collection, responsible voting, or punishment."' Consequently,
requiring offenders to pay their legal-financial obligations before re-
enfranchisement violates the Equal Protection Clause.
A. Notwithstanding Ramirez, Traditional Equal Protection Principles
Apply to Washington's Felon Re-enfranchisement Law
Under Ramirez, Washington is permitted to disenfranchise felons
upon conviction because states may constitutionally distinguish for
voting rights purposes between offenders and all other citizens.2"'
However, Washington's felon re-enfranchisement law involves
distinctions among offenders not distinctions between offenders and
other citizens. The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Ramirez does not
address whether distinctions among offenders are constitutional.212
Consequently, Ramirez's holding does not apply to felon re-
enfranchisement, and its sanction of disenfranchisement should not be
translated into a sanction of discriminatory re-enfranchisement laws.
Although Ramirez is inapplicable, the U.S. Supreme Court's holding
in Hunter, which also deals with disenfranchisement, should be applied
to felon re-enfranchisement laws. Unlike Ramirez, the issue in Hunter
was not the state's decision to disenfranchise persons convicted of crimes
while granting voting rights to other citizens.2"3 Rather, the issue in
Hunter was Alabama's decision to distinguish between black and white
offenders when selecting crimes that would require
disenfranchisement.2"4 By applying a traditional Equal Protection
analysis to Alabama's disenfranchisement law, the Court demonstrated
208. See infra notes 176-181 and accompanying text (establishing that states cannot distinguish
between offenders based on financial circumstances) and notes 128-134 and accompanying text
(establishing that states can distinguish among citizens based on offender status).
209. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.,
395 U.S. 621,626-27 (1969).
210. See infra Part V.C.
211. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at54.
212. Id.
213. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 224 (1985) (laying out the issue in Hunter).
214. Id.
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that ordinary Equal Protection principles apply when states decide felon
voting rights on a basis other than offender status.21 5 Therefore, the
Hunter analysis applies to any felon voting rights law-including a re-
enfranchisement law-that distinguishes among offenders on a basis
other than their criminal conviction.216  Washington's felon re-
enfranchisement law distinguishes among offenders based on ability to
pay.217 Thus, the Hunter analysis applies and Washington's re-
enfranchisement restriction must satisfy traditional Equal Protection
principles.
B. Washington's Re-Enfranchisement Process Must Pass Strict
Scrutiny
Because normal Equal Protection principles apply to felon re-
enfranchisement processes, courts must also determine the level of
judicial review appropriate for re-enfranchisement laws. Generally courts
make this determination by identifying the basis for the disparate
treatment and the right at stake.2"' Washington's felon re-
enfranchisement law separates offenders into two groups based on
whether or not they have paid their legal-financial obligations. 9 In
addition, Washington's felon re-enfranchisement laws involve a
fundamental right: voting.220 Laws that infringe a fundamental right
based on an individual's financial circumstances require strict scrutiny.
2
Consequently, Washington's re-enfranchisement law must survive strict
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
215. Id. at 233; see also supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
216. For example, in Hunter, if Alabama had purposefully made it more difficult for blacks to be
re-enfranchised than whites, it is hard to imagine that the result in the case would have been any
different. See supra notes 135-45 and accompanying text.
217. WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3 and WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.637 (2002) (re-enfranchising
only those offenders who have paid their legal financial obligations and received a sentence
discharge).
218. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972).
219. WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3 and WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.637 (2002).
220. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (establishing the right to vote as
fundamental); WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3 and WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.637 (2002) (linking voting
rights to discharge and payment of legal financial obligations.)
221. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,381 (1978).
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1. Washington 's Re-Enfranchisement Law Treats Offenders
Differently Based Solely on Their Ability to Pay Legal-Financial
Obligations.
By requiring that offenders pay their legal-financial obligations before
re-enfranchisement, Washington separates offenders into two groups-
those who have sufficient financial resources to pay their legal-financial
obligations and those who do not-and grants only one group the right to
vote. Washington's requirement thus results in the same unconstitutional
separation of offenders based on ability to pay as the requirement struck
down by the U.S. Supreme Court in Williams.2 2 In Williams, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that states cannot deny indigent offenders their
liberty by requiring them to remain in prison beyond the statutory
maximum in order to work off their debts.2 3 The Court's reasoning in
Williams suggests that states cannot create opportunities for non-indigent
offenders to gain access to fundamental rights like liberty when the same
opportunities are necessarily out of reach for indigent offenders.224
Contrary to Williams, Washington law provides only those offenders
with sufficient financial resources to pay their legal-financial obligations
access to voting rights, and as a result the fundamental right to vote is
necessarily out of indigent offenders' reach.
As the Williams Court held, the U.S. Constitution forbids disparate
treatment based on individuals' financial resources, even if the state
imposes the legal-financial obligations as part of a criminal sentence.2 5
According to the Court, a law based on payment of legal-financial
obligations is discriminatory when it presents some offenders with the
opportunity to regain their fundamental rights but effectively denies the
same opportunity to other offenders because of their economic
circumstances.226 In identifying the discrimination, the Court suggested
that the focus should be on the effect of the state requirement rather than
its source.227 Therefore, courts should focus on the discriminatory effect
of Washington's legal-financial obligations requirement (keeping poor
222. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
223. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243-44 (1970).





offenders, but not rich ones, from the franchise) rather than the source of
the legal financial obligation (a criminal conviction).
2. Given the Opportunity to Vote Through Washington's Re-
Enfranchisement System, an Offender's Right to Vote Becomes
Fundamental
Because wealth is not a suspect classification within the U.S. Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause,228 laws that visit
different consequences on offenders based on economic circumstances
must also restrict a fundamental right in order to receive strict scrutiny. 2 9
Washington's re-enfranchisement law satisfies this second requirement
because it implicates the fundamental right to vote. Though states do not
have an affirmative, constitutional duty to provide citizens with voting
rights, the Court has established that once states provide citizens with the
opportunity to vote, that opportunity becomes a fundamental right
protected by the U.S. Constitution.230
Like its grant of voting rights to all citizens, Washington does not
have an affirmative, constitutional duty to give offenders the right to
231vote. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment allows Washington to deny offenders the right to
vote while granting it to all other citizens.232 Therefore, Washington may
permanently disenfranchise felons-all felons-without any
constitutional problems.233 However, once Washington grants some
offenders the right to vote, it has stepped outside the protection of
Section 2 because it is no longer distinguishing between citizens based
on whether they have been convicted of a felony, but is distinguishing
among offenders based on some other criteria. Hence, Washington's
decision to re-enfranchise offenders has the same effect as its decision to
grant all citizens voting rights: an offender's right to vote again becomes
fundamental and it cannot be restricted in ways that violate the Equal
Protection Clause.
228. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); James v. Valtierra, 402
U.S. 137 (1971).
229. NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 44, at 849-50.
230. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).





In Johnson, the federal district court mistakenly refused to recognize
an offender's fundamental right to vote. 4 According to the court, an
offender's right to vote, within the context of re-enfranchisement, is not
fundamental because that right has already been, and could continue to
be, constitutionally withheld by the state. 5 In other words, the court
suggested that felons lose all stake in the right to vote, and consequently
offenders do not receive the Constitution's voting right protections
during re-enfranchisement.236  The Johnson court's reasoning is
problematic for two reasons. First, it ignores the U.S. Supreme Court's
analysis in Hunter that demonstrates that voting rights laws must survive
a traditional Equal Protection analysis when they are discriminatory on a
basis other than offender status."z Second, and more importantly, the
court's holding is inappropriate because it ignores the fact that voting's
status as a fundamental rights is directly linked to--and arises from-the
state's grant of the right to vote. Therefore, while states can
constitutionally take away all felons' voting rights and never restore
them, states that choose to re-grant the right to vote to offenders thereby
also invoke voting's status as a fundamental right. Thus, Washington
may not establish re-enfranchisement requirements that grant the right to
vote to some offenders while effectively denying it to others without
satisfying the Equal Protection Clause's strict scrutiny standard. To
survive this standard, the restriction must be necessary to achieve a
compelling governmental interest.23
C. Washington's Restriction of Offenders' Voting Rights Based on the
Failure to Pay Legal-Financial Obligations Does Not Survive Strict
Scrutiny
Washington's re-enfranchisement requirement based on the payment
of legal-financial obligations commits the same harm as the statute struck
234. 214 F. Supp. 2d. 1333, 1342-43 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
235. Id. at 1343.
236. Id.
237. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text. For example, despite Hunter's implication
to the contrary, the Johnson court's reasoning suggests a state could decide to re-enfranchise only
offenders with last names beginning with the letters A-M without running into any constitutional
problems. Faced with this hypothetical and Hunter's holding, the Johnson court's assertion that re-
enfranchisement requirements are completely outside the scope of the Constitution's voting rights
protections seems unlikely.
238. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972).
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down by the U.S. Supreme Court in Zablocki: it conditions a
fundamental right on the payment of legal-financial obligations without
advancing a compelling state interest.2 39 In Zablocki, the Court accepted
for the purposes of argument that Wisconsin's interest in debt collection
was compelling.24 However, the compelling interest alone did not save
Wisconsin's statute from constitutional defect. 4 The Court held that
despite the presence of a compelling interest, the statute violated the
Equal Protection Clause because the restriction was unnecessary to the
advancement of that interest.242 Compelling interests may also motivate
Washington's restriction, but nevertheless the restriction fails strict
scrutiny because it is not a necessary means of achieving those interests,
and thus violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Although Washington's legislative record does not reveal the state's
purpose behind conditioning the restoration of voting rights on the
payment of legal-financial obligations,243 court opinions and legal
commentators have suggested three possible state interests. 244 First, states
have an interest in collecting payment on outstanding legal-financial
obligations.245 Second, states have an interest in promoting responsible
use of the ballot.246 Third, states have an interest in punishing offenders
for their crimes and for refusing to pay their legal-financial
obligations. 47 While there is surely debate about the extent to which
these state interests are "compelling," like the Zablocki Court, this
Comment assumes arguendo that interests in debt collection, responsible
voting, and punishment are compelling governmental interests and
further that they are actual interests of Washington state. This Comment




243. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
245. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 245 (1970); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 389-90.
246. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
247. In the last 100 years, states and courts have generally not advanced this interest when
promoting disenfranchisement laws. KEYSSAR, supra note 50, at 162-63. However, in a motion for
summary judgment in the case of Johnson v. Bush, the state of Florida did advance its punishment
interests when explaining its re-enfranchisement restrictions. Defendant's Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment, Johnson v. Bush, (Jan. 4, 2002) (00-3542-CIV-King). The trial
court, rejecting the plaintiff's claim that the restitution requirement constituted an unconstitutional




accepts these interests as compelling to emphasize the fact that the
central flaw in Washington's re-enfranchisement requirement is not the
governmental interest put forward to support it. Rather, the fatal flaw in
Washington's requirement is that the restriction is an unnecessary
infringement on the right to vote and is not narrowly tailored to achieve
compelling governmental interests. In requiring that restrictions of
fundamental rights must achieve a compelling governmental interest, the
U.S. Supreme Court has set the constitutional standard high. The Court
requires states to demonstrate that their laws not only support a
compelling interest, but also that they are essential and narrowly tailored
to the interest's achievement.24 Washington's re-enfranchisement
restriction, analyzed in the context of its three interests, does not meet
this standard.
First, Washington's interest in collecting payment on outstanding
legal-financial obligations does not justify the broad infringement on
offenders' voting rights because the restriction is not necessary to the
advancement of the state's debt collection interests. Like the law struck
down in Zablocki, Washington's denial of voting rights until payment of
legal-financial obligations is, at best, an indirect method designed to
influence offenders' decision to pay their legal-financial obligations.249
For example, offenders who are denied re-enfranchisement may or may
not pay their outstanding legal-financial obligations because nothing in
Washington's re-enfranchisement restriction compels them to pay. Yet,
as the U.S. Supreme Court indicated in Zablocki and Williams, state
restrictions on fundamental rights that only indirectly advance the
"collection device rationale" are unconstitutional, especially where the
state has a number of more direct collection options available.25° In fact,
Washington has a number of more direct, and almost certainly more
effective,25" ' methods for collecting payment on offenders' legal-financial
obligations. For example, Washington may enforce collection through
248. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 44, at 639.
249. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 389-90. Discouraging regulation of voting rights as a way to achieve
unrelated state interests, the Court held has that "the use of the franchise to compel compliance with
other, independent state objectives is questionable in any context." Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 299
(1975).
250. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 389-90; Williams, 399 U.S. at 245.
251. Because the act of denying offenders' voting rights until payment does not in itself collect
additional money, it is impossible to quantify the effect of Washington's re-enfranchisement
restriction on the collection of legal-financial obligations.
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garnishment of wages252 and sale of real property." 3 And, parties other
than the state can collect the legal-financial obligation of restitution
through a civil action." 4 These direct measures provide a sharp contrast
to Washington's re-enfranchisement restrictions, in which the only direct
effect is the denial of the right to vote. Following the Court's decision in
Zablocki, Washington's denial of offenders' voting rights is not a
narrowly tailored means of advancing its debt collection interests
because the state's other collection devices do not infringe on offenders'
fundamental rights.255
Second, Washington's interest in promoting the responsible use of the
ballot is not advanced by its restriction of offenders' voting rights based
on non-payment of legal-financial obligations. Courts have accepted a
state's interest in responsible voting for some voting rights restrictions
such as literacy tests256 and felon disenfranchisement." 7 In Johnson, the
federal district court also cited Florida's responsible voting interests as
justification for its re-enfranchisement restrictions, stating that states
have an interest in determining felons' "readiness to return to the
electorate.""25 For Washington's payment requirement to be necessary
for the advancement of a responsible voting interest, the state must
demonstrate that offenders who have paid their legal-financial
obligations are more responsible voters, and therefore more ready to
return to the electorate, than offenders who have not paid them. A
successful demonstration of this sort, however, is severely limited by the
U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Harper, which made clear that
possessing the financial resources to pay a fee is not relevant to a
citizen's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.259 As
Harper suggests, the payment requirement by which Washington re-
enfranchises some offenders but not others is an irrelevant consideration
252. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760(3) (2002).
253. Legal-financial obligations are enforceable in the same manner as a civil judgment, which
may be enforced through the sale of real property. See id. §§ 9.94A.760(4); 4.56.190.
254. Id. § 9.94A.760(4).
255. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 389-90.
256. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959). Despite the U.S.
Supreme Court's sanction of literacy tests, Congress abolished them in the South as part of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, and extended the ban nationwide in 1970. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra
note 79, at 124.
257. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
258. Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d. 1333, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
259. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
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in promoting the intelligent use of the ballot.26 Consequently re-
enfranchising only those offenders who have paid their legal-financial
obligations is not a necessary and narrowly tailored means of advancing
responsible voting interests.
Third, Washington's re-enfranchisement restriction is not a narrowly
tailored means of advancing the state's punishment interest. In citing a
punishment interest, Washington is likely targeting one of two types of
offender misbehavior: willful failure to pay legal-financial obligations or
criminal activity. As shown below, in both cases of misbehavior,
Washington's punishment interest is not advanced by its re-
enfranchisement restriction.
Washington cannot use continued disenfranchisement as a way of
punishing delinquent debtors because the voting rights restriction is not
narrowly tailored to those offenders who are willfully refusing to pay
their legal-financial obligations. Under Washington's re-enfranchisement
law, voting rights are withheld not only from offenders who are willfully
refusing to pay their legal-financial obligations but also from indigent
offenders who are unable to pay. However, indigency does not equal
misbehavior.26' Poor offenders will necessarily take longer to repay their
legal-financial obligations because their limited financial resources will
require lower monthly payments."' As a result, withholding re-
enfranchisement until payment of legal-financial obligations does not
punish only misbehaving offenders, but it punishes all offenders who
have limited financial resources. The re-enfranchisement restriction is
not a narrowly tailored means of punishing misbehaving offenders who
refuse to pay their debts.
Washington's felon re-enfranchisement requirement is also not
narrowly tailored to advance its interest in punishing criminal behavior
because the extent of offenders' punishment through disenfranchisement
260. Id.
261. See generally Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) (holding that it is fundamentally
unfair to incarcerate offenders for non-payment of legal-financial obligations without considering
the willfulness of the non-payment).
262. In fact, Washington law requires that the sentencing court establish offenders' legal-financial
obligations payment schedule based on an offender's financial resources. WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 9.94A.760(1); 9.94A.760(10) (2002). Because the statute requires sentencing judges to base the
payment schedule on an offender's financial resources, poor offenders will be ordered to pay lower
monthly payments than non-indigent offenders. The lower monthly payments guarantee that poor
offenders will be denied voting rights for a longer period than non-indigent offenders with the same
legal-financial obligation requirement. See id.
Washington Law Review
is conditioned on the irrelevant factor of their ability to pay, rather than
on their criminal activity. 263 Offenders are sentenced to a number of
distinct forms of punishment, of which legal-financial obligations and
disenfranchisement are two mandatory and independent types.2"
However, in conditioning the restoration of voting rights on payment of
legal-'financial obligations, Washington blends these two distinct forms
of punishment, causing the extent of offenders' disenfranchisement to be
conditioned on their ability to pay legal-financial obligations.265 As a
result, certain offenders receive the additional punishment of continued
disenfranchisement based not on the severity of their crime, or any other
legitimate sentencing consideration, but on their ability to pay the legal-
financial obligations.
The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Williams is a useful guide for
understanding the constitutional flaw in this punishment arrangement.
The Williams Court declared that states cannot incarcerate offenders
longer than the statutory maximum just because they are poor,266
essentially holding that states cannot impose a fine and then convert it to
extended jail time if the offender does not have the means to pay the
fine.267 Williams' principles apply to Washington's re-enfranchisement
requirement because Washington imposes legal-financial obligations,
and subsequently conditions the duration of disenfranchisement on
offenders' ability to pay, in the same way that Illinois conditioned the
duration offenders' jail time on their ability to pay imposed fines.
Accordingly, Washington's re-enfranchisement restriction, which
reserves extra punishment for poor offenders, is not narrowly tailored to
advance Washington's interest in punishing all criminal behavior.
In sum, requiring payment of legal-financial obligations before re-
enfranchisement is a broad infringement on the fundamental right to
vote. The re-enfranchisement restriction is not justified by Washington's
three compelling interests because, like Zablocki, the infringement of the
fundamental right is not necessary or narrowly tailored to the
263. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 668 (holding that ability to pay is an irrelevant factor in voting).
264. The sentencing court must assess at least $500 in legal-financial obligations and it must
revoke the offender's right to vote. See supra Part I.A.; Part I.B.
265. Cf Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970) (holding that Illinois could not blend
distinct forms of punishment-imprisonment and fines-by requiring poor offenders to remain in
prison until the fine was paid.).
266. Williams, 399 U.S. at 243.




governmental objectives. Therefore, Washington's re-enfranchisement
law fails strict scrutiny. To comply with Equal Protection requirements,
Washington should eliminate the requirement that offenders pay their
legal-financial obligations before regaining voting rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
Washington's re-enfranchisement law treats offenders differently-
granting some, but not others, the right to vote-based solely on their
different abilities to pay legal-financial obligations. What is more, voting
is the only fundamental right Washington restricts in this way. The
disparate treatment inherent in Washington's re-enfranchisement
requirement is particularly troubling given the U.S. Supreme Court's
directive that affluence or the payment of money cannot be a condition of
voting. Washington's re-enfranchisement provisions must be held to the
same Equal Protection standard as laws enfranchising all other citizens:
restrictions are only permissible if narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest. Washington's re-enfranchisement law
does not meet this strict scrutiny standard because the infringement of
offenders' voting rights is unnecessary to advance Washington's
compelling governmental interests. Consequently, it violates the Equal
Protection Clause, and Washington should eliminate its requirement that
offenders pay their legal-financial obligations before regaining voting
rights.
334
